Mixed Migration Centre

PAPER

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Displaced from Ukraine to Warsaw

A case study on journeys, living conditions, livelihoods and future intentions

This briefing paper is part of a series of three “sister” MMC publications covering displacement of people fleeing Ukraine in Europe, focusing on the cities of Berlin, Bern, Warsaw. You can find all three publications here.

Acknowledgement: This document uses MMC data to explore the profiles of people from Ukraine currently residing in Warsaw, their aspirations, journey, situation in the host city, assistance and needs, livelihoods and their future migration intentions. The content of this report is entirely the responsibility of MMC. The data used in this paper stems from a research project conducted in partnership with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Observatory on Smuggling of Migrants, funded by the British Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA). MMC extends its gratitude to the enumerators who conducted the data collection and to all respondents involved in this study.

Introduction

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia on 24 February 24 2022 triggered a mass displacement crisis, which resulted in millions of people being internally displaced in Ukraine and seeking refuge in neighbouring countries in Europe and beyond, with more than 874,000 people leaving Ukraine in the first week of the conflict.[1] As of 19 June 2023, 6 million have been registered across Europe, including 995,000 recorded in Poland alone, making it the second most important host country for people fleeing Ukraine in the European Union.[2] With a large existing Ukrainian population (1.35 million Ukrainians already living in the country before the 2022 invasion), pre-existing migration networks and good transportation infrastructure with Ukraine,[3] Poland became a major destination for refugees from Ukraine, as well as a hub for movements to other European countries.[4]

The activation of the 2001 European Union (EU) Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) in March 2022[5] simplified the registration process across EU countries for Ukrainians fleeing the conflict (as well as for specific groups of non-EU nationals), granting them access to a status, full services and rights while preventing asylum services in Europe from being overwhelmed. Reacting swiftly to the crisis, Polish authorities activated the Standard Operational Procedure 10 of the State Crisis Management Plan,[6] and passed the Special Act on Assistance for Ukrainian citizens as early as March 2022,[7] of which the implementation was deemed "exemplary".[8] Despite those successes, and the strong mobilization of the Polish civil society, [9] the country faces specific policy challenges for the long-term integration of people from Ukraine. The country did not have a coherent and comprehensive migration policy by 2022,[10] and the Office of Foreigners is reported to be struggling to absorb the additional workload.[11] As the conflict continues, and the risk of a protracted displacement crisis grows, concerns about the needs and vulnerabilities of people from Ukraine in Warsaw are increasing, and data is scarce.

This briefing paper explores new data collected by MMC on the profiles of people from Ukraine currently in Warsaw, their journeys from Ukraine, drivers and aspirations, potential discrimination in the city, assistance and needs, livelihoods and income, and long-term migration intentions.

Methodology

This analysis is based on 609 surveys conducted between February and March 2023 in Warsaw, carried out face-to-face with people who left Ukraine after February 2022, and on nine semi-structured interviews with key informants, conducted face-to-face in Warsaw and

1 Wagner, M. (2022) *The war in Ukraine and the renaissance of temporary protection - why this might be the only way to go*, ICMPD
2 UNHCR, (2023) *Ukraine Refugee Situation* (Retrieved on 21st June 2023)
3 Duszczyk M., Kaczmarczyk P. (2022) *War and migration: the recent influx from Ukraine into Poland and possible scenarios for the future*, CMR Spotlight 4(39).
4 Duszczyk M., Kaczmarczyk P. (2022) *op. cit.*
5 Article 5 of Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001; Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022 establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC, and having the effect of introducing temporary protection.
6 Jaroszewicz M., Krępa M., Nowosielski M., Pachocka M, Wach D. (2022) *Russian aggression on Ukraine and forced migrations: the role of Poland in the first days of the crisis*, CMR Spotlight, No. 3 (37), March 2022, Special Issue.
7 Polish Government (2023), Legal Portal for people fleeing Ukraine - The Act on Assistance for Ukrainian.
8 Interview with a representative of a UN agency in Warsaw, May 2023.
9 Interview with a migration researcher in Warsaw, December 2022.
10 Duszczyk M., Kaczmarczyk P. (2022) *op. cit.* and Fedyuk, O., Kindler, M. (2016) *Ukrainian Migration to the European Union - Lessons from Migration Studies*. p.115.
11 Interview with a migration analyst, May 2023, Warsaw.

remotely, between December 2022 and May 2023. MMC used a non-randomized, purposive sampling approach for quantitative data collection, with a minimum quota of non-Ukrainian nationals who fled Ukraine, and monitoring for gender and age. The sample aims to achieve diversity and was primarily identified through social networks, and by targeting diverse places of residence such as hostels, shelters and private accommodation. Key informants were identified on the basis of their expertise and included representatives from NGOs, UN agencies, community leaders, researchers, as well as journalists.

Key findings

Journey

- **Most respondents left Ukraine at the very beginning of the war,** with slightly more than half of respondents (53%) paying for their journey.

- **10% of respondents paid for smuggling services to enter Poland**, which is higher than the reported use of smugglers in Bern and Berlin (2% and 5% respectively). Most respondents who paid to leave Ukraine illegally arrived in Warsaw in the very first weeks of the crisis.

Drivers and aspirations

- **War was the overwhelming reason for leaving Ukraine for all respondents**, with men more concerned about conscription than women.

- **Respondents chose Warsaw as a destination for a wide range of reasons**, mainly to feel safe (45%), because of livelihood opportunities (33%) and because it was recommended by other people (23%), family (18%) and friends (8%).

- **Most respondents reportedly took their decision to come to Warsaw independently (39%),** while family members were the main influence for others (parents for 21%, spouse for 15%, and children for 11%).

Discrimination, relationship with the local population and accommodation

- **32% of respondents (30% of Ukrainians and 42% of TCNs) reported having occasionally experienced discrimination in Warsaw,** which is higher than in Berlin and Bern and aligns with anecdotal claims of rising discrimination against TCNs and Ukrainians alike.

- **41% of respondents lived in houses or apartments for their family only**, with more Ukrainian men residing in more short-term accommodation than women.

Assistance and needs

- **Respondents received a wide range of assistance from NGOs and the civil society and from authorities**, most often language lessons (39%), support for regularization (37%) and food (28%) from NGOs, and access to healthcare (47%), access to transportation (31%) and language lessons (30%) from authorities.

- **Fewer TCNs than Ukrainians reported having had access to assistance when arriving in Warsaw**, from NGOs or authorities alike.

- **Despite assistance received, needs remain high,** with cash (59%), employment (46%), accommodation (41%), and healthcare (34%) cited as the most pressing ones.

- **Despite relying largely on assistance provided by NGOs and authorities, most respondents reported turning to friends and relatives in Warsaw or Ukraine when in need of support**.

- **When looking for services, respondents mostly relied on messaging apps, social media and websites**, much like in Bern and Berlin.

Livelihood and income

- **More than 70% of respondents in Warsaw were in paid employment, and 44% of respondents had a regular paid job,** although women are in more precarious jobs overall. 8% of respondents rely on occasional work in the informal labour market.

- Among respondents holding a job (N=426), **the four main sectors of employment reported by respondents in Warsaw are small business (24%), finance/IT (19%), domestic work (14%) and hospitality (10%).**

- **A large proportion of TCN respondents (mostly Belarusians) are working in the IT/finance sector, have kept their job from Ukraine, are better off than most Ukrainians, and reported fewer needs.**

- Of respondents with jobs, **a large majority of respondents found their current employment without any official intermediary, and a majority was satisfied with their jobs (61%).**

- **Women faced more barriers in accessing employment**, including lack of childcare.

Returns and future intentions

- **Most respondents had not been back to Ukraine (77%).** Those who had were almost exclusively women who had been once or a few times, and stayed for short periods of time (almost never more than a month), to visit friends and family.
- **Almost half of respondents in Warsaw planned to return to Ukraine permanently, which is more than was found in Bern and Berlin (approx. a third).** Results differ according to nationality: TCNs plan to stay permanently in Warsaw (41%) or move somewhere else (33%), with only 7% planning to return to Ukraine.

Profiles and legal status of respondents

Figure 1. Number of respondents by gender and nationality

Nationality	Gender		Total
	Women	Men	
Ukrainian	412	97	509
Not Ukrainian	45	55	100
Total	**457**	**152**	**609**

84% of respondents were Ukrainians. Among them, 81% were women and 19% were men (see Figure 1). 69% of Ukrainians interviewed in Warsaw were aged 36 years old or less and 31% were between 37 and 81 years old. The population interviewed is younger than in Berlin, where half of respondents were between 18 and 36 years old, and Bern, where only 31% of respondents were aged 36 or younger. As in Bern and Berlin, the vast majority of Ukrainian nationals interviewed had never lived outside of Ukraine before the war (93%). All of them spoke Ukrainian (99%) and almost all spoke Russian as well (92%).

16% of respondents (amounting to 100 individuals) did not have Ukrainian nationality and were third-country nationals (TCNs). A large majority of them are Belarusians (91 respondents), alongside two Georgians, two Israelis, one Latvian, one Nigerian and one Russian citizen. The gender ratio for TCNs is more balanced than for Ukrainians: 45% are women and, 55% are men (see Figure 1). TCNs interviewed were also, on average, much younger than Ukrainians, as 82% of them were between 18 and 36 years old, and just 18% were older than 36. The legal status in Ukraine of the TCNs interviewed varied: 31% were asylum applicants, 25% had a work permit, 10% were undocumented, 7% were recognized refugees, 3% had a family reunification permit, and 2% had a student permit; 21% of respondents had "other" as type of status.

Russian is the language most spoken by all respondents (93% overall), followed by Ukrainian, at 86%. More TCNs spoke languages useful for adapting to their life outside of Ukraine and in Poland, with two-thirds speaking English (67%), compared to 43% of Ukrainians, and 41% speaking Polish, compared to 32% of Ukrainians.

Half of all respondents were living alone in Poland (51%), while 35% were living with another adult (19% with their partner, 8% with other adult family or relatives, and 6% were with friends). A minority of 15% were living with their own child and 5 people had another child under their care. The situation is slightly different from Berlin, where a majority of respondents were living with other adults (65%), and from Bern, where 44% of respondents were living with their own child. In Warsaw, more women than men lived with their children (18% vs. 4%) and other adult family and relatives (10% vs. 4%).

Most interviewees came from urban areas in Ukraine (80% overall), with a slightly higher proportion of TCNs (95%) compared to Ukrainians (78%) coming from cities. Kyiv, Lviv, Kharkiv and Dnipro were the most frequently cited cities. There is a stark difference between Ukrainians and TCNs, as a majority of TCNs left cities with more than 1 million inhabitants (64% of TCNs came from Kyiv, 4% from Odesa and Dnipro), and a majority of Ukrainians were from smaller cities (only 24% from Kyiv, 15% from Kharkiv, Odesa and Dnipro, 61% from smaller cities).

At the time of interview, **the median duration of stay of respondents in Warsaw had been 325 days**, which is similar to the median duration of stay of respondents interviewed in Berlin (331 days) and Bern (327 days), and arguably enough time to provide for an accurate representation of the respondents' experience in the city.

Figure 2. What is your current migration/legal status here?[12]



A majority of respondents in Warsaw had temporary protection status (70%, see Figure 2). Almost all of the other respondents were either refugees (14%) or asylum applicants (6%), while only a handful reported being in an irregular situation. There were important differences between nationalities though. TCNs were in a more precarious situation, with only 30% having temporary protection status (compared to 78% of Ukrainians), and a higher proportion of them in the process of obtaining status (22% of TCNs and 2% of Ukrainians had applied for asylum; 12% of TCNs had applied for visas) or had a temporary status (15% of TCNs and 3% of Ukrainians).

12 Three observations about Ukrainians answering "Irregular / no legal documents to stay in this country" were taken out of Figure 2 due to an error identified during data processing. This modification does not have an impact on the rest of the analysis.

MMC's understanding of 'smuggler' and 'smuggling'

MMC uses a broad interpretation of the terms 'smuggler' and 'smuggling', one which encompasses various activities — paid for or otherwise compensated by refugees and migrants — that facilitate irregular migration. These include irregularly crossing international borders and internal checkpoints, as well as providing documents, transportation, and accommodation. This approach reflects refugees' and migrants' perceptions of smuggling and the facilitation of irregular movement. Our interpretation is deliberately broader than the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants definition. However, this does not imply that MMC considers all activities it includes in its broad understanding of smuggling to be criminal offences. MMC prefers to use the term 'human smuggling' instead of 'migrant smuggling' as smuggling involves both refugees and migrants.

This publication is produced in partnership with the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Observatory on Smuggling of Migrants. The Observatory uses the word 'smuggler' when it can reasonably be assumed that the crime of migrant smuggling is constituted, as per Article 3 of the UN Smuggling of Migrants Protocol, while the word 'facilitator' is used whenever the elements of (a) irregular entry and/or (b) financial or material benefit, could reasonably be assumed not to be in evidence. www.unodc.org/res/som

Journey

Figure 3. When did you arrive in Warsaw?



Much like in Berlin and Bern, a majority of respondents interviewed in Warsaw left the country between 24 February 2022 and the end of March 2022, and arrivals stabilized from May 2022 (see Figure 3). The general tendency represented here aligns with data from the Polish border guards, which displays a reduction in the numbers of people arriving around the end of March 2022,[13] and reports by migration researchers.[14]

13 Duszczyk M., Kaczmarczyk P. (2022) War and migration: the recent influx from Ukraine into Poland and possible scenarios for the future. CMR Spotlight 4(39).
14 Interview with a migration researcher in Warsaw, December 2022.

Although of a smaller magnitude than in Berlin, the slight increase in arrivals around September and October can be linked to growing concerns by Ukrainians regarding the approaching winter and attacks on the Ukrainian electricity network.[15] Most TCNs interviewed arrived at the very beginning of the crisis, with almost no new arrivals after June 2022.

Figure 4. How much money did you spend in total on your journey to this city?



Slightly more than half of respondents paid for their journey to Warsaw, with a median total amount of 98 euros (see Figure 4). Amongst respondents who paid for their journeys, TCNs reportedly paid more than Ukrainians (median of 181 euros for TCNs vs. 86 euros for Ukrainians), and men paid slightly more than women.

Figure 5. Did you pay anyone to provide transportation or documents to cross the border illegally during your journey? (not an official)



As in Berlin and Bern, the prevalence of respondents in Warsaw who paid for services to leave Ukraine illegally is very low.[16] In Warsaw, 90% of respondents reported they had not paid anyone to provide transportation or documents to cross the Ukrainian border irregularly during their journey (see Figure 5). The proportion is slightly higher in Warsaw compared to the two other cities (98% of respondents in Bern and 95% in Berlin did not pay anyone). TCNs used those services less often than Ukrainians (2% vs. 8%), which could be explained by the absence of restrictions on TCNs leaving the country, compared to Ukrainian nationals under Ukrainian martial

15 Interview with representatives of a civil society organisation in Berlin, May 2023.

16 As Poland does not require entry visas from Ukrainian nationals, crossing the Polish-Ukrainian border is only considered illegal by the Ukrainian law, under conditions set in the martial law. This does not constitute smuggling though, as there is no irregular entry to Poland. Under the Ukrainian martial law, most Ukrainian men (with exceptions) aged 18-60 years are required to stay in Ukraine to participate in war effort or for conscription. For more information about the martial law and exemption criteria as of 2023, see VisitUkraine.today (2023) Departure of men abroad in 2023: what has changed for military servicemen.

law. The very low incidence of smuggling from Ukraine to and within Europe reported by respondents in Bern, Berlin and Warsaw, strongly suggests the effectiveness of legal pathways – i.e. visa-free entry – and rapid access to basic services and rights – i.e. TPD – in preventing human smuggling, especially compared to the far higher incidence of smuggling in other protracted displacement crises, such as those relating to Afghanistan or Syria.

Drivers and aspirations

Unsurprisingly, the overwhelming majority of respondents, both Ukrainians and TCNs, **reported the war as the main reason for leaving Ukraine** in line with drivers reported in other studies.[17]

Figure 6. What effects of the war drove your decision to leave Ukraine?



When asked how exactly the war impacted the decision to leave, fear of physical harm or death was the most frequently cited (89%), followed by the need for income or loss of livelihoods (28%) and the loss or destruction of household property (21%, see Figure 6). Respondents interviewed in Bern and Berlin cited the same three primary concerns, in similar proportions. Unsurprisingly, given the rules enforced under Ukrainian

17 REACH, UNHCR (August 2022) Refugees from Ukraine to Poland Profiling Update August 2022.

martial law,[18] men reported the fear of conscription more frequently than women (28% vs. 1%). More TCNs than Ukrainians in Warsaw reported not having family or friends in Ukraine anymore as an important reason (15% vs. 2%), while Ukrainians, more likely to own property than TCNs, cited the loss or destruction of household properties much more frequently (24% vs. 5%).

Figure 7. Why did you decide to come here?



As for the other two cities, respondents' reasons for choosing Warsaw as a destination mirror the reasons for leaving Ukraine: feeling safe (45% of respondents) and income and livelihoods opportunities (33%) rank highest, see Figure 7. Although in smaller proportions, respondents' social networks and preexisting relationships also played a role for some: 23% of respondents followed the recommendation of people they know, while 18% and 8% respectively came because a friend or family lived in Warsaw. This is even more the case among TCN respondents, for whom recommendations by people they know and reuniting with friends (32% and 39% respectively) were more important than for Ukrainians (21% and 14% respectively). Considering that most TCNs interviewed are Belarusians, this can be explained by the

18 VisitUkraine.today (2023) [Departure of men abroad in 2023: what has changed for military servicemen.]

existence of a historical and dynamic diaspora in Poland, which actively supported Belarusians from Ukraine since the beginning of the crisis.[19]

In contrast with Bern, where fewer than 5% of the respondents cited government assistance, 16% of respondents in Warsaw also chose Poland because of the help provided by the Polish government, and more so among TCNs (27%, compared to 13% of Ukrainians). **However, it is important to note that respondents do not always associate the temporary protection with government assistance, since knowledge about temporary protection ranks relatively low overall (15%).**

Most respondents reportedly took the decision to come to Warsaw independently (39% said they were influenced by no one or nothing), while parents (21%), spouse (15%), children (11%) and family or friends in another country (10%) or in Ukraine (10%) were the main influences. Interestingly, social media ranked lowest (3%), highlighting the strong prevalence of (offline) social networks in choosing destinations.

Discrimination, relationships with the hosting population and accommodation

Figure 8. Since you arrived here, have you or anyone in your family felt any discrimination?



Although not constant nor systemic, discrimination was part of respondents' experience in Warsaw: only 66% had never felt any discrimination, while 23% of respondents reported feeling discriminated "rarely", 8% "sometimes, and 1% "often". Feelings of discrimination seem to be slightly higher for TCNs, who were only 57% to say they never felt discriminated (vs. 69% for Ukrainians), but who reported more frequently feeling "rarely" discriminated than Ukrainians (33% vs. 21% - see Figure 8). Although key informants highlight the general support among the population in Poland for Belarusians coming from Ukraine,[20] as well as the support provided by the existing Belarusian civil society, others point to rising forms of discrimination against them.[21]

19 Interview with a migration researcher in Warsaw, December 2022, Babakova O., Fiałkowska K., Kindler M., Zessin-Jurek L. (2022) *Who is a 'true' refugee? On the limits of Polish hospitality*, CMR Spotlight 6 (41).
20 Babakova O., Fiałkowska K., Kindler M., Zessin-Jurek L. (2022) *Who is a 'true' refugee? On the limits of Polish hospitality*, CMR Spotlight 6 (41).
21 Debriefing with the enumerator's team in Warsaw, April 2023.

Figure 9. Why have you felt discriminated against?



Among those who reported discrimination (N=201), nationality (83%) and migration (33%) status were largely reported as the most common reasons (see Figure 9). In line with reports of growing cases of discrimination against people from Belarus in Poland,[22] TCNs reported nationality as the overwhelming factor of discrimination (98%). The situation is more nuanced for Ukrainians who reported being also discriminated because of their migration status (38%).

22 Debriefing with the enumerator's team in Warsaw, April 2023.

Figure 10. What kind of accommodation do you currently live in?



As for the type of accommodation respondents were living in at the time of the interview, 41% lived in a house or apartment for their family, and only 7% reported being hosted by a local household. This seems to differ from other sources, such as the OECD - which estimated the share of those housed by private hosts reached 90%[23] - but closer to estimates from the Union of Polish Metropolises (20%).[24]

Results vary depending on nationality as well as gender. **A much larger share of women were living in shared apartments compared to men (25% vs. 7%), while more men were residing in more unstable housing such as hostels (9% vs. 6%) and reception centres (13% vs. 5% - see Figure 10).**

In addition, a much larger share of TCNs (70%) were living in a house or an apartment to themselves than Ukrainians (36%). This could certainly be explained by the fact that TCNs interviewed (almost all from Belarus) seem likely to be financially better off than Ukrainians, with more stable incomes, working for the same employer they had before the war in highly qualified sectors (see section Livelihoods and Income for more details).

23 OECD (2023) OECD Policy Responses on the Impacts of the War in Ukraine - What are the integration challenges of Ukrainian refugee women? - Accommodation data in this paper varies significantly from other sources, including from the OECD. This may be explained as an evolution in the housing situation. However, the non-representative sample means that further research would be needed to draw this conclusion.

24 Union of Polish Metropolises, (2022) Social And Psychological Effects Of Selected Housing Solutions For Refugees From Ukraine.

Assistance and needs

Figure 11. Assistance received from NGOs, civil society or community, or authorities



A large majority of respondents reported receiving a wide range of assistance from NGOs and civil society and from authorities in Warsaw. **The types of assistance most provided by NGOs and authorities are different, highlighting the complementarity of those two groups of actors in providing the necessary support to respondents (see Figure 11).** NGOs seem to have played a more prominent role in the provision of language lessons (38% vs 29% from the authorities) and support for regularization of status (36% vs 26%). In contrast, authorities were more prominent in healthcare (47% vs 20% from NGOs), access to transportation (31% vs. 7%) and education (25% vs. 14%). Overall, women more frequently received assistance with language lessons (42% vs. 28%), support for regularization of status (39% vs. 28%), legal advice (19% vs. 9%) and psychological support (14% vs. 4%).

Figure 12. After arriving here, have you or anyone in your family received any kind of assistance from NGOs, civil society or community?



Fewer TCN respondents than Ukrainians reported receiving assistance in Warsaw, either from NGOs or authorities: 40% reported not having received any assistance from NGOs, compared to 21% of Ukrainians (46% vs. 11% from authorities). TCNs also reported language lessons less frequently (27% vs. 40%), as well as support for regularization of status (26% vs. 38%) or food (7% vs. 31%). They more often received assistance for employment (28% vs. 20%) and education (17% vs. 13%) than Ukrainians, however (see Figure 12). Although discrimination of TCNs, and specifically Belarusians arriving in Warsaw, was documented in anecdotal cases, and cannot be ruled out as an explanation, findings from the section "livelihoods and income" below seem to be suggesting that the specific set of people from Belarus interviewed already had more income stability than Ukrainians, and may not have actually sought much support.

Figure 13. What are your most pressing needs at the moment?



Needs remain high across the entire population and, when asked about their most pressing ones, respondents cited cash (59%), employment (46%), accommodation (41%), and healthcare (34%) more often. Those are the same needs, in quite similar proportions, as those reported in research in August 2022, suggesting there has not been a clear decrease in needs over time.[25] Women, generally, reported needs more often than men in all the main categories (see Figure 13). Importantly, older respondents reported a higher need for healthcare (47% vs. 27%), which could be explained by the age of respondents and highlight their specific vulnerability.

25 REACH, UNHCR (August 2022), op. cit.

There were also differences between nationalities, with Ukrainians reporting higher needs than TCN in all the principal types of needs. In addition, 15% of TCN reported not having any needs, whereas almost no Ukrainians did. As mentioned above this can be explained by the relatively higher qualifications and level of employment of TCNs in our sample (see Livelihoods and income section). **The only types of needs for which TCN report a higher need are contacting families and psychological support**. As in Berlin, key informants reported that strong prejudice against psychological support is likely to be a barrier for Ukrainians to seek or accept psychological support,[26] meaning that psychological needs are certainly underreported by respondents.

Figure 14. When you need support, who do you turn to?



When in need of support, families (42%), relatives in Warsaw (21%), in Ukraine or elsewhere (39%), and compatriots in Warsaw (18%) are the main support networks mobilized both by Ukrainians and TCNs, highlighting the crucial role played by social networks in information sharing and assistance. Interestingly, Ukrainians rely particularly heavily on relatives in Ukraine or in other countries (46%, making it the most reported group), highlighting the importance of trust and social networks over geographic proximity, in seeking help or getting information. Ukrainian respondents in Berlin followed the same tendency as 33% of them reported relying on relatives in Ukraine or other countries.

26 Interviews with a migration researcher in Warsaw, December 2022, with a migration analyst in Warsaw, May 2023 and with a project manager in an NGO in Warsaw, May 2023 and OECD (2022) Supporting the social and emotional well-being of refugee students from Ukraine in host countries.

Age also plays a role, as older people seem to turn to local NGOs more than the young (14% vs. 9% of respondents) while relying much less on friends in Warsaw (23% vs. 53%), or relatives in Ukraine or in other countries (see Figure 14).

Figure 15. What are your preferred channels to look for information about services you need?



Respondents were also asked about their preferred channels to find information about services. As in Berlin and Bern, answers show a clear reliance on social media, as well as a general lack of interest in more traditional media, such as TV, radio and newspapers. In-person interactions, reported by 36% of respondents, are cited in similar proportions as in Bern, but do not rank as high as in Berlin (57% of respondents there). Although respondents over 37 years old reported engaging more often in-person (44% vs. 33%), and less often through social media than the younger generation (52% vs. 77%), this generational effect is low, as messaging groups and social media are still the privileged channels reported by older respondents (see Figure 15).

Livelihood and income

Figure 16. Are you earning money now?



More than 70% of respondents in Warsaw had paid employment, and most respondents had a regular paid job (44%, see Figure 16). This is higher than in other studies, both from the OECD (25% of formal employment rate in November 2022),[27] and from the Union of Polish Metropolises (30% of respondents working in September 2022),[28] while more aligned with journalistic sources reporting half of working-age people who fled Ukraine were employed in Poland.[29]

Although more than a quarter of respondents do not earn any money (28%), this proportion is much smaller in Warsaw than in Bern (82% not earning money) and similar to Berlin (21%), where 63% of respondents also reported being on social welfare. This difference, although stark, could be explained by the difference in social benefits and employment policies implemented in the three countries. Key informants reported that social benefits in Poland are relatively low, and not sufficient to live on,[30] while the recent literature about migrants' economic integration suggests a growing demand for labour, as well as pre-existing simplified registration procedures for migrant workers.[31] In Bern, on the contrary, social benefits are reportedly high enough to live on decently, [32] while acquiring the skills needed (mostly language skills) to enter the job market from a better position, more aligned with the level of their existing skill set. This is also the case in Berlin, where authorities have deliberately tied social benefits to language classes, pushing people to take language lessons for better labour market integration,[33] which suggests a delayed effect in the proportion of people from Ukraine entering the labour market.

Women have access to more precarious jobs overall: fewer report regular jobs (41% vs. 51%), and more of them report not earning any money (30% vs. 20%) or holding contracts for casual/occasional work than men (15% vs. 5%, see Figure 16). Interestingly, TCNs have much higher access to the job market than Ukrainians, both through

27 OECD (2022) *op. cit.*
28 Union of Polish Metropolises, (2022) *op. cit.*
29 Vorozhko T. (2022), How Displaced Ukrainians in Poland Find Work While Benefiting Its Economy, VOA.
30 Interview with a project manager in an NGO in Warsaw, May 2023.
31 Bukowski M., Duszczyk, M. (Eds), (2022) *HOSPITABLE POLAND 2022+ - How to wisely support Poland and Poles in helping people fleeing the war in Ukraine?*
32 Interview with the representative of a CSO in Bern, April 2023.
33 Mixed Migration Centre, (2023), *Displaced from Ukraine to Berlin. A case study on journeys, living conditions, livelihoods and future intentions.*

regular jobs (64% vs. 40%) and self-employment (13% vs. 3%), which in our case seems to be related to the specific characteristic of the sample on non-Ukrainians interviewed (see below the box "The case of employment of Belarusian in the IT sector in Ukraine").

8% of respondents engage in occasional work without a contract or in the informal labour market (8%), in quite similar proportions between Ukrainians and TCNs, which is higher than in Bern (2%) but quite in line with results in Berlin (6%) This echoes concerns from the OECD about an important and unrecorded number of Ukrainian working "informally or remotely" in Poland.[34]

The legal environment and labour laws in Poland are reportedly confusing for job seekers and learning about their rights represents an important challenge according to NGOs, which is only made more acute for respondents who do not speak Polish.[35] In addition, in Poland, different types of contracts contracts do not offer the same level of protection. While "employment contracts" offer working conditions as per the labour law, "civil-law contracts" are more flexible (no limitation in working times, no mandatory benefits and leave), leading to a higher risk of exploitation for vulnerable refugees and migrants.[36] Those different elements amplify the vulnerability of respondents to potential labour exploitation.

Figure 17. What kind of sector are you making money in?



Among respondents holding a job (N=426), the four main sectors of employment reported by respondents in Warsaw are small business (24%), finance/IT (19%), domestic work (14%) and hospitality (10%, see Figure 17). The distribution of respondents across those sectors is heavily gendered, like in Bern and Berlin, as many more women than men are in the small business sector (29% vs. 9%), in the domestic or cleaning sector (19% vs. 0%) in hospitality (14% vs. 2%) or civil service/teaching (6% vs. 2%). Comparatively, men are much more present in the finance or IT sectors, (37% vs. 12%), the transportation sector (15% vs. 1%) the construction sector (13% vs. 1%) and the security sector (7% vs. 1%).

34 OECD (2022) *op. cit.*
35 Interview with a project manager in a protection NGO in Warsaw, May 2023.
36 Interviews with a project manager in a protection NGO in Warsaw and with representatives of a UN organisation in Warsaw, May 2023.

The case of employment of Belarusians in the IT sector in Ukraine

Figure 18. Are you earning money now?



The labour market integration of our sample of TCNs in Warsaw represents a peculiar case. The group of TCNs we interviewed is almost entirely composed of people from Belarus (91 over 100 respondents) which, comparatively to Ukrainians, seem better off in Warsaw: a higher proportion of them has a regular job compared to Ukrainians (64% vs. 40%) or are self-employed (13% vs. 4% - see Figure 18); more of them are satisfied with their occupation (74% vs. 57%) or "very satisfied" with their life in Warsaw (26% vs. 17%); a higher proportion, is involved in the Finance/IT sector (46% vs. 11%), which is a sector with higher education level requirements than other sectors where Ukrainians are most present, such as small business, domestic and cleaning and hospitality.

The homogeneity of the profiles of Belarusian respondents working in IT can be explained by the history of migration from Belarus to Ukraine, as Ukraine extended visa-free travel pathways for Belarusians in 2020, including additional incentives for highly qualified Belarusian working in the IT sector.37 As IT companies are often more decentralized organisations, it is no surprise that Belarusians in our sample, more often than Ukrainians, report continuing to work for the same employer as in Ukraine (21% vs. 13%). This also explains why a much smaller proportion of Belarusians consider that their job does not match their qualifications, compared to Ukrainians (10% vs. 27%).

This specific case suggests, as a result, a relatively high level of economic resilience for Belarusians with a highly qualified job and working in environments flexible enough to ensure continuity with their work in Ukraine before the war, even for individuals who were migrants in Ukraine. This relates to recent findings in OECD research, suggesting Poland starts seeing bifurcations in labour market outcomes, "where alongside elementary occupations, Ukrainians [and Belarusians in this case] are being employed in highly skilled sectors with little in-between, leading to very different labour market experiences among the refugee population."38

Among the respondents who found a job (n=426), a very large majority of respondents found their current occupation without any official intermediary (NGO, association, employment agency, authorities…). Direct response to job advertisements (18%), relying on their direct network or community (18%), through friends, families or hosts (15%) or online networks or messaging apps (14%) were the most cited ways to find a job. This is important considering the significant effort made by Polish authorities to launch digital tools and platforms to assist refugees from Ukraine with job-matching.[39]

Of the same group (n=426), a majority were satisfied with their jobs (almost two-thirds, 61%). 23%, however, considered their job does not reflect their education/level of qualification. This point is particularly acute for women (7% men vs. 29% women), highlighting the higher gender gap for women who look for positions fitting their qualifications.

37 Babakova O., Fiałkowska K., Kindler M., Zessin-Jurek L. (2022) *op. cit.*
38 OECD (2022) *op. cit.*
39 OECD (2022) *op. cit.*

Figure 19. Since coming here, what would you consider to be the three main challenges to accessing a decent job or running a business?



Similarly to Bern and Berlin, the lack of skills in the local language is the most important barrier for all respondents (62%), as reported in other research.[40] The mismatch between jobs and skills and qualification ranks second (28%), and the lack of documents to validate qualifications comes third (21% - see Figure 19).

In a gender perspective, barriers faced by women are multiple and intersectional, and seem higher than for men. Lack of language skills, for instance, it is reported by a higher proportion of women (69% vs. 49% men). The lack of job opportunities is also felt more strongly by women (16% vs. 10% for men). Taking care of children seems to be another major barrier for women to access employment as 21% of them report it as a reason (vs. 0% for men). This aligns with qualitative information, suggesting that social benefits are quite low in Warsaw, and that the lack of childcare services prevents women

40 Bukowski M., Duszczyk, M. (Eds), (2022) *op. cit.*

from finding income-generating activities,[41] although it is important to acknowledge that Polish authorities have sought to address this challenge by opening new facilities.[42] Overall, 60% of women engage in some forms of formal employment (regular jobs, self-employed and occasional ones), which is still higher than in Bern and Berlin (15% and 8%, respectively).

Less than 6% of all respondents reported being dissatisfied with their life in Warsaw. In similar proportions by age or gender, two-thirds of respondents were either "very satisfied" (18%) or "rather satisfied" (44%), while a last third remained neutral.

Returns and future intentions

Figure 20. Since you left, have you been back to Ukraine?



A large majority of respondents (77%) had not been back to Ukraine at the time of the interview. This proportion aligns with responses in Bern (77%) and Berlin (82%), which seems counterintuitive, given the geographical proximity of Ukraine and reports that many refugees from Ukraine chose Poland for its proximity (in addition to other factors).[43] In addition, almost no TCNs went back to Ukraine (less than 3%) which seems logical given the low proportion of TCNs with relatives and friends still in Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, given the current conscription rules included in Ukrainian martial law, almost no men went back, whereas a third of women (29%) did, since coming to Warsaw (see Figure 20).

41 Interviews with a migration researcher in Warsaw, December 2022, and with a Project Manager in an NGO, May 2023.
42 OECD (2023) op. cit.
43 Union of Polish Metropolises (2022), A New Home or a Temporary Refuge? The situation of refugees from Ukraine applying for the Polish personal identification number (PESEL) in the 12 largest Polish cities at the end of April 2022.

Figure 21. Why did you go back to Ukraine?



Although the sample is smaller (n=130) and results should be interpreted with caution, **a large majority of the women who went back to Ukraine did not go back on a regular basis, but only went once (9%) or a few times (34%).** In addition, women who went back tend to stay for a short period of time, mostly a few days (62%), a week (6%) or between a week and a month (21%). The overwhelming reasons to go back are friends and family (65%) and administrative reasons (37%, see Figure 21).

Figure 22. In the future, do you plan to stay here, return to Ukraine or go to another country?



When asked about their long-term intentions regarding return to Ukraine, an important proportion of respondents still did not know (25%), while 47% planned to return permanently to Ukraine and 19% planned to stay in Poland permanently (see Figure 22). This result stands in contrast with responses in Bern and Berlin, where only a third of respondents planned to return permanently to Ukraine. A higher proportion of older people (above 37 years old) plan to go back to Ukraine permanently (57% vs. 41%), accounting for the difficulties to adjust to a new life abroad.

Results also differ according to nationalities, as preferences of TCNs and of Ukrainians are opposite. Most TCNs plan to stay permanently in Poland (41%), or move elsewhere (18%), while returning to Ukraine is the least cited plan (7%). Key informants explained that despite difficulties to register in Warsaw, some TCNs would see Warsaw as an entry point for legalization of their status in the EU, with the prospect of better salaries and job opportunities.[44]

When asked about the reasons for planning to go back (n=286), personal reasons are the most prevalent reasons to go back to Ukraine ("It is my home, family there, friends there, I have a community"), much like in Berlin and Bern. Only 10% of respondents reported they would go back to find better opportunity, hinting at the current difficulties for respondents to find job opportunities in a country affected by the war.

Figure 23. What do you need to happen to go back to Ukraine?



Unsurprisingly the most often cited pre-condition to the able to go back to Ukraine was the end of the war (76%), while 37% expect Russian forces to leave, and 26% wait for the fighting to stop in the region where they are from (see Figure 23). 22% said they will wait for the reconstruction and recovery of the country to start to go back to Ukraine, (in almost exact same proportions as in Berlin and Bern) which sets their project in a longer timeline.

44 Interview with the project manager of an NGO in Warsaw, May 2023.

Mixed Migration Centre

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